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In this study, we investigate how central bank transparency about views on future 
productivity growth influences social welfare. To this end, we use a New 
Keynesian framework in which both the central bank and private agents are 
engaged in filtering problems regarding the persistence of productivity growth. 
Since the central bank and private agents do not know the true value of the 
signal-to-noise ratio, the gain parameters used in the filtering problems can be 
heterogeneous. If the central bank is not transparent, private agents must conjecture 
the central bank's estimate of the efficient level of the real interest rate. Under this 
setup, we show that central bank transparency does not necessarily improve social 
welfare. It can potentially yield a welfare loss, depending on (i) the gain 
parameters used by the central bank and private agents and (ii) private agents' 
conjecture on the gain parameter used by the central bank. If the central bank is 
uncertain about the combination of these gain parameters, it is sensible for the 
central bank to respond strongly to the variations of the inflation rate, because the 
misperceptions about these parameters become the source of demand shock. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In recent years, the implications of central bank transparency have been actively
investigated in monetary economics.1 According to Geraats [2002], central bank
transparency is deﬁned as “the absence of asymmetric information between monetary
policymakers and other economic agents” (p. F533). If we apply this deﬁnition to the
context of monetary policy, the large degree of transparency indicates the situation in
which a central bank provides private agents with ample information regarding mon-
etary policymaking, such as a policy objective, policy strategy, economic perspective,
and so on. If this information has some degree of impact on private agents’ activity,
especially on their expectation formation, then central bank transparency potentially
inﬂuences economic dynamics, and ultimately, social welfare.
Among the many aspects of central bank transparency, this study focuses on “eco-
nomic transparency” in the terminology of Geraats [2002]. Economic transparency
concerns the economic information that is used for monetary policy, including eco-
nomic data, policy models, and central bank forecasts (Geraats [2002], p. F540). In
our view, economic transparency is distinct from other kinds of transparency in that
it does not deal with the behavior of the central bank itself. Rather, it concerns the
central bank’s views on economic conditions or economic structures, which are mainly
determined by the activities of private agents. In this sense, economic transparency is
more indirectly related to a central bank’s monetary policymaking than other kinds
of transparency, such as political, procedural, policy, and operational transparency,
which are mostly related to the behavior of the central bank itself.
In the case of economic transparency, it will be arguable whether a central bank
should seek to be perfectly transparent, because the central bank usually faces con-
siderable uncertainty as to economic conditions or economic structures. If we take
account of this kind of uncertainty, it is not so straightforward a task to evaluate the
value of central bank transparency because the information provided by the central
bank to private agents might be inaccurate, and such inaccurate information might
cause economic ﬂuctuations.
The problem of uncertainty becomes particularly serious with respect to the trend
growth of aggregate productivity. There is no doubt that trend productivity growth
is the key variable for monetary policymaking, because theoretically it is the crucial
determinant of the potential growth of GDP and the equilibrium level of the real
interest rate. However, it is widely recognized that it is quite diﬃcult to obtain an
accurate estimate of the trend growth of aggregate productivity, especially in real
time. Concerning this issue, Bernanke [2005] remarks that “notably, imperfect data
and the diﬃculties of distinguishing permanent from temporary changes will make
1See Geraats [2002] and Cruijsen and Eijﬃnger [2007] for a survey of the literature on central
bank transparency.
2changes in secular productivity growth exceptionally diﬃcult to identify in real time,
both for the private sector and for the Federal Reserve. The need to discern the un-
derlying economic forces and to react appropriately in an environment of incomplete
information makes monetary policy an exceptionally challenging endeavor.”
Once we take account of the large uncertainty, the issue of whether a central
bank should be greatly transparent, even if it is quite uncertain about the views on
future productivity growth, will deserve the attention of monetary policymakers. In
particular, the issue is complicated because, as is noted by Bernanke, not only the
central bank but also private agents face uncertainty regarding the persistence of
productivity growth. In such a case, the desirability of central bank transparency
is likely to depend on private agents’ forecast about the future productivity growth.
Therefore, an analysis of central bank transparency in this respect should clarify how
the value of such transparency depends on the forecasting mechanisms for future
productivity growth used by the central bank and private agents.
Furthermore, if economic dynamics depend on central bank transparency and the
forecasting mechanisms used by the central bank and private agents, an optimal pol-
icy response will not be independent of these aspects. Therefore, it is also important
to study how optimal monetary policy depends on central bank transparency and the
forecasting mechanisms used by the central bank and private agents. In considering
this issue, it is particularly important to analyze what kind of monetary policy ro-
bustly performs well against a wide variety of private agents’ forecasting mechanisms
because, in practice, a central bank faces great uncertainty regarding the forecasting
mechanism used by private agents.
Based on the above argument, we investigate how central bank transparency
about the views on future productivity growth inﬂuences social welfare. To this
end, we introduce a simple version of a New Keynesian model, which is very close
to the model of Galí, Lopez-Salido, and Valles [2003] or Ireland [2004]. Since we
judge that central bank transparency mainly inﬂuences economic dynamics through
the process of private agents’ expectation formation, the forward-looking nature of
the New Keynesian model is suitable for carrying out our analysis. In addition, we
consider that the simplicity of our version of the New Keynesian model is favorable,
since we can explicitly calculate the analytical solution and evaluate the impact of
central bank transparency in terms of social welfare, not in terms of some ad hoc
central bank’s loss function.
In this study, we assume that the central bank and private agents cannot fully
identify the transitory and persistent components of productivity growth and that
they are engaged in ﬁltering problems regarding the persistence of productivity
growth. This setup has already been introduced in some previous studies, such as
Tambalotti [2003], Edge, Laubach, and Williams [2005, 2007], and Gilchrist and
Saito [2007]. These studies have shown that private agents’ gradual recognition of
3the persistence of productivity growth can replicate the persistent movements of ma-
jor macroeconomic variables, which are usually found in vector autoregression (VAR)
analysis. Therefore, these studies imply that the inclusion of a ﬁltering mechanism
is beneﬁcial in yielding a realistic impulse response to productivity shocks. However,
none of the studies analyze the inﬂuence of central bank transparency.
The contribution of our study is that we investigate the inﬂuence of central bank
transparency in an environment in which both central bank and private agents are
ﬁltering with respect to the persistence of productivity growth. In carrying out the
analysis, we introduce heterogeneity in the forecasting mechanisms used by the cen-
tral bank and private agents. Figure 1 presents forecasts on real output growth made
by the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) and economists in the private sector. This
ﬁgure shows that the FRB and economists in the private sector do not necessarily
share the same forecasts for future output growth in each period.2 The possibility of
heterogeneous forecasts is essential in examining the issue of transparency, because
it provides private agents with necessity to conjecture the central bank’s forecast on
future productivity growth and gives rise to the possibility that central bank trans-
parency has some impact on private agents’ expectations concerning future monetary
policy.
In this analysis, we assume that the heterogeneous forecasts arise because the
central bank and private agents use diﬀerent forecasting rules. More concretely,
they use diﬀerent gain parameters in the ﬁltering problem. The reason why they do
this is explained by the uncertainty about the variances of transitory and persistent
productivity shocks. The uncertainty on this respect is highly plausible, because
some empirical studies (Stock and Watson [1998] and Roberts [2001]) show that
the uncertainty regarding these shock variances is large in the U.S. economy, and
the recent analysis of Justiniano and Primiceri [2006] further shows that there have
been large structural changes in shock variances in the U.S. economy, which explains
the decline of the volatility of U.S. major macroeconomic variables. In this study, we
assume that whereas the central bank and private agents use the same information set
concerning current productivity growth, they can use diﬀerent gain parameters since
they can diﬀerently assess the possibility of structural change in shock variances.3
The heterogeneity in gain parameters yields the heterogeneous forecasts for future
2Although output growth does not directly correspond to productivity growth, it is fair to judge
that at least some portion of the diﬀerent forecasts on output growth comes from the heterogeneity
in the views on future productivity growth.
3In the context of adaptive learning, Honkapohja and Mitra [2005] examine the E-stability con-
dition in an environment where central bank and private agents use heterogeneous constant gain
parameters to estimate their subjective reduced-form model. As is well explained in Evans and
Honkapohja [2001], constant gain is used when agents take account of the possibility of structural
change. Although our problem is ﬁltering (not learning), our usage of heterogeneous gain parame-
ters could be explained by the central bank’s and private agents’ awareness of the possible future
structural change in the variances of productivity shocks.
4productivity growth, which become the disturbance to economic ﬂuctuations.4
Our study is distinct from those that analyze central bank transparency in an
environment where a central bank or private agents have private information on
current economic conditions (Amato and Shin [2003], Morris and Shin [2005], Hellwig
[2005], Walsh [2007], and Lorenzoni [2007]) because we do not explicitly introduce
any private information to both agents. As a result, our study does not introduce any
strategic interaction between the central bank and private agents in the formation of
their expectations for future productivity growth. Therefore, the situation we analyze
can be seen as a simpliﬁed benchmark. However, we still consider that the existence
of private information is an empirical problem because, as noted by Kohn [2005],
most of the data used by central bank in forecasting aggregate economic variables is
also available to private agents.5
We deﬁne a central bank as transparent (or a central bank as adopting a transpar-
ent regime) if the central bank announces its forecast on future productivity growth,
and we also deﬁne a central bank as opaque (or a central bank as adopting an opaque
regime) if the central bank does not announce the forecast. Private agents have to
conjecture the central bank’s estimate on future productivity growth to form their
expectations for future output and the inﬂation rate, since the central bank’s fore-
cast on future productivity growth corresponds to the central bank’s estimate on the
eﬃcient level of the real interest rate, which inﬂuences the future interest rate. If the
central bank is transparent, private agents’ conjecture on central bank’s estimate on
the eﬃcient level of the real interest rate is just equal to the true value of the central
bank’s estimate. However, if the central bank is opaque, private agents’ conjecture
does not necessarily coincide with the true value of the central bank’s estimate. In
an opaque regime, private agents estimate the central bank’s forecast on future pro-
ductivity growth by using private agents’ conjecture about the gain parameter used
by the central bank, which is not necessarily the same as the central bank’s true gain
parameter.
We evaluate the welfare gains (or possibly the losses) from the central bank trans-
parency. In doing so, we simply examine how welfare losses diﬀer between the trans-
parent regime and the opaque regime. To restrict our attention to the pure impact
4Bullard and Eusepi [2005] investigate the economic dynamics of the New Keynesian model under
a mechanism in which both the central bank and private agents are learning the structural parameters,
including the process of productivity growth. Although their analysis is close to ours, they do not
introduce the heterogeneity in learning mechanisms between the central bank and private agents. In
addition, they do not investigate the inﬂuence of central bank economic transparency.
5Kohn [2005] remarks that “in the United States, we have some indirect evidence that crowding
out of private views has not increased even as the Federal Reserve has become more talkative. Market
interest rates have continued to respond substantially to surprises in economic data.” He also states,
“that markets continue to react strongly to incoming data is not surprising. Predicting interest rates
far enough into the future is not just about what others–including the central bank–think; over
time those rates should be tied to objective factors–for example, the forces of productivity and
thrift. Diﬀering views about these factors give scope for opportunities to proﬁt from independent
research and betting against the crowd.”
5of the central bank’s information provision to private agents, we exclude the possi-
bility that the central bank changes the regime (transparent or opaque) period by
period, because this possibility inevitably raises the problem of credibility. For the
same reason, we rule out the possibility that central bank announces a forecast of
productivity growth that diﬀers from its true forecast.
Our results show that central bank transparency about the views on future pro-
ductivity growth does not necessarily improve social welfare. It can potentially yield
a welfare loss, depending on (i) gain parameters used by the central bank and pri-
vate agents and (ii) private agents’ conjecture about the gain parameter used by the
central bank. If the gain parameters used by the central bank and private agents are
homogeneous, then central bank transparency always improves social welfare. How-
ever, if these gain parameters are heterogeneous, central bank transparency can be
either welfare-improving or welfare-reducing. In the latter case, the value of central
bank transparency crucially depends on private agents’ conjecture on the gain para-
meter used by the central bank. Our study shows that if the central bank is uncertain
about the combination of the gain parameters (including private agents’ conjecture),
it is sensible for the central bank to respond strongly to the variations of the inﬂation
rate, because the misperceptions on these parameters become the source of demand
shock.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our model,
including the economic structure, the process of productivity growth, and the mecha-
nisms of forecasting future productivity growth used by the central bank and private
agents. In Section 3, we investigate the inﬂuence of central bank transparency on
economic dynamics and social welfare. In particular, we clarify under what condi-
tions central bank transparency is welfare-improving or welfare-reducing. In Section
4, we investigate how the desirable monetary policy actions depend on central bank
transparency and the forecasting mechanis m su s e db yt h ec e n t r a lb a n ka n dp r i v a t e
agents. Speciﬁcally, we investigate the optimal response to inﬂation rate in the cen-
tral bank’s simple monetary policy rule. In doing so, we also examine the inﬂuence of
private agents’ learning mechanism regarding the gain parameter used by the central
bank. In Section 5, we summarize the results of this study and present some possible
extensions of it.
2M o d e l
We use a simple version of a New Keynesian model in which all the existing goods are
consumption goods and there are no frictions other than price stickiness and markup
ﬂuctuations. This version is quite similar to the model of Galí, Lopez-Salido, and
Valles [2003] or Ireland [2004]. However, in contrast to their models, ours introduces a
ﬁltering problem in which the central bank and private agents estimate the persistence
6of productivity growth. In addition, our model describes a situation in which private
agents conjecture the central bank’s views on future productivity growth when the
central bank is opaque in this respect.
2.1 Household














where Yt is aggregate consumption (equal to aggregate output), Nt is labor supply,
β is the discount factor, and η is the parameter related to labor supply elasticity.
Utility maximization yields the following ﬁrst-order conditions:




where it is the nominal interest rate, πt is the inﬂation rate, ρ is the discount rate
(calculated as ρ = −lnβ), Wt is the nominal wage rate, and Pt is the price level.
Y ∗
t and r∗
t denote the output and the real interest rate that should be realized in an
environment in which both price stickiness and the distortion due to the time-varying
markup are absent. Following Galí [2006], we call this environment an “eﬃcient
steady state.”6 Similarly, we call Y ∗
t “eﬃcient output”a n dr∗
t the “eﬃcient interest
rate.” These diﬀer from the popular concept of “natural output” and the “natural
interest rate,” which will be realized in an environment in which only price stickiness
is absent. This distinction has quite an important implication for welfare analysis
(see Galí [2006]).
Since the Euler equation (2) must hold even in the eﬃcient steady state, Y ∗
t and
r∗
t satisfy the following relationship:
lnY ∗
t = Et lnY ∗
t+1 − (r∗
t − ρ). (4)
We deﬁne xt as the output gap (xt ≡ lnYt − lnY ∗
t ).7 Then, (2) and (4) yield the
following dynamic IS equation:
xt = Etxt+1 − (it − Etπt+1 − r∗
t). (5)
6In our model, the desired markup varies around a steady-state level. In an eﬃcient steady state,
the markup is ﬁxed at the steady-state level, though it is not equal to unity. Therefore, the distortion
due to the steady-state level of the desired markup remains even in the eﬃcient steady state.
7xt is the welfare-relevant output gap, in the terminology of Galí [2006].
72.2 Firm
The representative ﬁrm’s production function is given by
Yt = AtNt, (6)
where At is the level of aggregate productivity. The nominal marginal cost (MCt)i s
calculated as follows:
MCt = WtNt/Yt, (7)
where Wt is the nominal wage rate, which is assumed to be given for each ﬁrm.
We deﬁne ψt as the desired markup, which should be realized under a ﬂexible












where θt moves around the steady-state value (θ)i ne a c hp e r i o d .
If we apply Calvo’s [1983] and Yun’s [1996] speciﬁcation of sticky prices in which
each period a measure of 1−α ﬁrms can reset prices, ﬁrms’ proﬁt maximization yields
the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) with respect to real marginal cost:
πt = βEtπt+1 +[ ( 1− α)(1 − βα)/α](lnRMCt +l nψt), (9)
where RMCt represents real marginal cost (RMCt = MCt/Pt).
To rewrite NKPC in terms of the output gap, we provide the ﬁrm’s optimality
condition in the eﬃcient steady state as follows:
Pt = ψMCt, (10)
where ψ is the steady-state value of the desired markup (ψ = θ
θ−1). Then, from (3),
(6), (7), and (10), we can express eﬃcient output Y ∗
t as follows:8
Y ∗
t = ψ−1/ηAt. (11)




Finally, from (9), (11), and (12), we derive NKPC in terms of the output gap as
8As we have already explained, eﬃcient output corresponds to the output that should be realized
in the absence of price stickiness and time-varying components of the markup (ψt − ψ). So the
distortion that arises from the steady-state markup (ψ) remains even in the eﬃcient steady state.
This is the reason why eﬃcient output depends on ψ.
8follows:
πt = βEtπt+1 + κxt + ζt, (13)
where κ is the slope of NKPC (κ ≡ η(1−α)(1−βα)/α)a n dζt is the cost-push shock,
which is deﬁned as follows:
ζt ≡ (1 − α)(1 − βα)/α(lnψt − lnψ), ζt ∼ i.i.d.N(0,σζ).
2.3 Monetary Policy
The central bank introduces the following simple monetary policy rule:
it = r∗C
t + γπt + ξt, ξt ∼ i.i.d.N(0,σξ), (14)
where r∗C
t is the central bank’s estimate of the eﬃcient interest rate, γ is the respon-
siveness to the inﬂation rate, and ξt is the monetary policy shock. Since we assume
that the central bank cannot directly observe the eﬃcient interest rate, the rule in-
troduces the central bank’s estimate on the eﬃcient interest rate (r∗C
t ), not the true
value of r∗
t.
Throughout this study, we assume that private agents know the functional form
of (14), including the value of γ. However, private agents cannot directly observe
the value of r∗C
t and ξt unless the central bank announces these values. In that
case, they must conjecture the values of r∗C





conjectures. Private agents form expectations (Etxt+1 and Etπt+1)b yu s i n gt h e
following monetary policy rule:9
it = r
∗P[C]




In the simulations of later sections, we evaluate the value of central bank transparency
in terms of social welfare. Woodford [2003] shows that in the simple version of the











2.5 Process of Productivity Growth
In modeling the process of productivity growth, we follow previous studies, such
as Tambalotti [2003], Edge, Laubach, and Williams [2005, 2007], and Gilchrist and
9We assume that private agents regard the process of ξ
P[C]
t as i.i.d.
10In deriving this social welfare function, we assume the existence of an output subsidy that oﬀsets
the distortion due to the presence of the desired markup in the steady state (ψ).
9Saito [2007]. In these studies, productivity growth is determined as the combination
of transitory and persistent components as follows:
zt ≡ lnAt − lnAt−1 = z + εt + μt, εt ∼ i.i.d.N(0,σε), (17)
μt = φμt−1 + νt, νt ∼ i.i.d.N(0,σν), (18)
where zt is productivity growth, z is the long-run equilibrium productivity growth,
εt is the transitory productivity shock, μt is the persistent productivity shock, φ is
the persistence of μt (0 < φ < 1), and νt is the innovation to μt.
We assume that the central bank and private agents cannot fully identify the
values of εt and μt, though they can observe the values of zt, z,a n dφ.S o t h e y
are engaged in the ﬁltering problem to estimate the persistence of the productivity
shock. In the following argument, μC
t and μP
t denote the subjective estimates about
the persistent productivity shocks estimated by the central bank and private agents,
respectively.
2.6 Eﬃcient Interest Rate
The eﬃcient interest rate is the key variable in this study because, under monetary
policy rule (14), central bank transparency about the views on future productiv-
ity growth inﬂuences economic dynamics through private agents’ conjecture on the
central bank’s estimate on the eﬃcient interest rate.
From (4) and (11), the true value of the eﬃcient interest rate is calculated as
follows:
r∗
t = ρ + Et lnAt+1 − lnAt. (19)
Notice that r∗
t is determined by private agents’ forecast on future productivity
growth (Et lnAt+1 − lnAt). Therefore, r∗
t depends on private agents’ information
set available at time t. Since we assume that private agents have their subjective
estimate on persistent productivity shock (μP
t ), r∗
t is calculated as follows:
r∗
t = ρ + z + φμP
t . (20)
Thus, r∗
t depends on private agents’ estimate on the persistent productivity shock
(μP
t ), rather than on the true value of the persistent productivity shock (μt).
The central bank knows that the eﬃcient interest rate is determined by (19).
However, the central bank cannot directly observe private agents’ forecast on future
productivity growth (μP
t ), because the central bank cannot directly observe private
agents’ expectations. For this reason, the estimated eﬃcient interest rate (r∗C
t ), which
is included in monetary policy rule (14), depends on the central bank’s subjective
10estimate on the persistent productivity shock (μC
t ):
r∗C
t = ρ + z + φμC
t . (21)
Private agents need to conjecture the value of r∗C
t to form the expectations for
future output and the inﬂation rate because, under (14), (17), (18), and (21), the
future interest rate depends on the central bank’s current estimate on the eﬃcient
interest rate. We deﬁne μ
P[C]
t as private agents’ conjecture about the central bank’s
estimate on the persistent shock (μC
t ). Then, r
∗P[C]
t is calculated as follows:
r
∗P[C]




As already explained, both private agents and the central bank cannot directly ob-
serve each component of productivity shock (εt and μt). So they estimate the persis-
tence of productivity growth through ﬁltering problems.
Notice that (17) and (18) constitute a state-space model. Therefore, if the central
bank and private agents know the true value of the signal-to-noise ratio, which is
deﬁned as the relative size in the variances of persistent and transitory productivity
shocks (σ2
ν/σ2
ε), they can obtain the optimal estimate on μt by using the optimal
Kalman ﬁlter algorithm. However, since we assume that the central bank and private
agents do not know the true values of shock variances (σ2
ν and σ2
ε), they cannot
compute the optimal gain parameter for the ﬁltering problem. Therefore, we assume
that the central bank and private agents use their subjective gain parameters (λC
and λP) to obtain their estimates on the persistent productivity shock (μC
t and μP
t ).
The algorithms are given by
μC
t = φμC




t−1 + λP[(zt − z) − φμP
t−1]. (24)
Here λC and λP are constant values.11 These are not necessarily equal to the value
of the optimal Kalman gain, because the central bank and private agents face large
uncertainty on shock variances (σν and σε).12 In addition, these gain parameters can
be heterogeneous, because the central bank and private agents can diﬀerently assess
the possibility of structural changes in shock variances. As is evident in (23) and
(24), neither the central bank nor private agents have private information on current
11Edge, Laubach, and Williams [2007] show that the Kalman ﬁlter with constant gain can replicate
the public and private forecasts on long-run labor productivity growth reported in the survey data.
12The optimal Kalman gain is given by
λ
























11productivity growth (zt). Therefore, this framework does not raise the possibility of




Next, we specify the process through which private agents form their conjecture
on the central bank’s estimate on the persistent productivity shock (μC
t ). In this
respect, we assume that private agents know the central bank’s ﬁltering algorithm
(23), though they do not know the value of λC. In other words, private agents
know that the central bank uses the same information set as theirs regarding current
productivity growth (zt) and that the only diﬀerence from private agents is in the









t−1 + λP[C][(zt − z) − φμ
P[C]
t−1 ], (25)
where λP[C] is private agents’ conjecture on the central bank’s gain parameter (λC).
In most of the simulations, we assume that λP[C] is constant. However, in Section 4.3,
we introduce a mechanism through which private agents gradually learn the value of
λC by observing the central bank’s policy actions.
2.8 Reduced-Form Solution
In this subsection, we derive the reduced-form solution of our model. This solution is
useful to obtain an intuitive understanding of simulation results in the later sections.
The key issue in deriving a reduced-form solution is how we specify the process
of private agents’ expectation formation. In this respect, we assume that private
agents possess knowledge about the structure of the economy. That is, private agents
know the functional forms and the parameters of structural equations. This is the
same assumption as in standard rational expectations. The only diﬀerence is that in
our study private agents substitute their conjecture about the eﬃcient interest rate
into the monetary policy rule if the central bank adopts an opaque regime. In other
words, private agents form expectations for the future output gap and inﬂation rate
by using their subjective monetary policy rule (15), not the true monetary policy rule
(14). Then the model for determining private agents’ expectations consists of (5),
(13), (15), (20), and (22). By substituting (15), (20), and (22) into (5), we obtain
the following expression of the dynamic IS equation:
xt = Etxt+1 − (γπt − Etπt+1) − φ(μ
P[C]
t − μP
t ) − ξ
P[C]
t . (26)
Now the model for determining private agents’ expectation is reduced to (13) and
(26). To calculate the expectations, we apply the undetermined coeﬃcient method.












t + b3ζt. (28)









Then, by substituting (27), (28), (29), and (30) into (13) and (26), the coeﬃcients










1+κγ, and b3= 1
1+κγ.
The intuition for the determination of expectations (29) and (30) is as follows.
As in (20), the eﬃcient interest rate is determined by private agents’ estimate on the
persistent productivity shock (μP
t ). Suppose that at period t private agents raise μP
t
by 1 percentage point. In addition, suppose that private agents raise the conjecture
about the central bank’s estimate on the persistent productivity shock (μ
P[C]
t )b y0 . 6
percentage point. Then, private agents consider that the remaining 0.4 percentage








t multiplied by the persistent parameter φ (0.4 × φ% in this numerical
example) remains at period t +1 . Then, private agents expect that the output gap
and inﬂation rate at period t+1will not be neutralized by monetary policy at period
t+1. Therefore, their expectations for the output gap and inﬂation rate deviate from
zero.
Once private agents’ expectations are calculated as (29) and (30), we derive the
solutions of the actual output gap and inﬂation rate by substituting the expectations
into the model that includes the central bank’s true monetary policy rule (14). The
model consists of (5), (13), (14), (20), and (21). By substituting (14), (20), and (21)
into (5), we obtain the following expression of the dynamic IS equation:
xt = Etxt+1 − (γπt − Etπt+1) − φ(μC
t − μP
t ) − ξt. (31)
The model for determining the output gap and inﬂation rate is reduced to (13) and
13This solution is called the minimal-state-variable (MSV) solution. We introduce the MSV solu-
tion to restrict our attention to bubble-free solutions. See McCallum[1983, 1999] for the details of
the MSV solution.
13(31). By substituting (29) and (30) into (13) and (31), we obtain the reduced-form












t )+d3ζt + d4ξt, (33)














1+κγ, and d4= −κ
1+κγ.
(32) and (33) indicate that the output gap and inﬂation rate are determined by
four components: (i) the diﬀerence between μ
P[C]
t and μC
t ; (ii) the diﬀerence between
μC
t and μP
t ; (iii) the cost-push shock; and (iv) the monetary policy shock. Of these,
the ﬁrst two components are quite important in this study.
The ﬁrst component (μ
P[C]
t − μC
t ) represents private agents’ misperception re-
garding the central bank’s estimate on the persistent productivity shock (μC
t ). If the
central bank adopts a transparent regime, the ﬁrst terms of (32) and (33) vanish,
because private agents correctly recognize the value of μC
t . However, if the central
bank adopts an opaque regime, the ﬁrst terms of (32) and (33) are not necessarily
zero. Therefore, economic dynamics can diﬀer under the transparent regime and the
opaque regime.
The second component (μC
t − μP
t ) represents the heterogeneity between the cen-
tral bank and private agents regarding the estimates on the persistent productivity
shock. The diﬀerence between μC
t and μP
t inﬂuences economic dynamics, because
it corresponds to the central bank’s misperception about the eﬃcient interest rate.
Since μC
t and μP
t are determined respectively by the central bank and private agents,
the diﬀerence between μC
t and μP
t does not vanish even if the central bank announces
the value of μC
t . Thus, the second terms of (32) and (33) express the direct impact
of the central bank’s misperception about the eﬃcient interest rate on the current
output and inﬂation rate.14
In the next section, we examine the economic dynamics and the inﬂuence of
central bank transparency. In doing so, we pay particular attention to the ﬁrst two
components of (32) and (33).
14Orphanides and Williams [2002, 2005] investigate the direct impact of the central bank’s mis-
perception of the natural interest rate.
143E c o n o m i c D y n a m i c s
3.1 Parameter Setting
In setting parameters, we refer to previous studies.15 T h ed i s c o u n tf a c t o ri sβ =0 .99,
as in many studies. As for the slope of NKPC, we set κ =0 .10, following Ireland
[2007]. The elasticity of substitution between each individual good is θ =3 .778,
following Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans [2005].16 The policy responsiveness to
the inﬂation rate is γ =1 .5. The parameters for the process of productivity growth
are φ =0 .95, σε =0 .01,a n dσν =0 .001, following Gilchrist and Saito [2007]. The
standard error on the monetary policy shock is σξ =0 .000975, which is estimated
in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans [1999]. The standard error on the cost-push
shock is σξ =0 .0007, following the estimation result of Ireland [2007].
3.2 Impulse Response in a Transparent Regime
Here, we examine the impulse response to transitory and persistent productivity
shocks when the central bank adopts transparent regime. In this regime, the central
bank announces the estimate on the persistent productivity shock (μC
t ). This an-
nouncement virtually implies the central bank’s disclosure about the estimate on the
eﬃcient interest rate (r∗C
t ), because there is a one-to-one correspondence between μC
t
and r∗C
t ,a si n( 2 1 ) .
In a transparent regime, private agents do not have any misperception about the
central bank’s estimate on the persistent productivity shock (μC
t ). Therefore, μ
P[C]
t
is always equal to μC
t . However, μP
t can diﬀer from μC
t , because μC
t and μP
t are
determined by the gain parameters respectively set by the central bank and private
agents (λC and λP). To examine the inﬂuence of heterogeneity between λC and λP,
we compare the impulse responses in two cases: the case of a homogeneous gain
(λC = λP =0 .05) and the case of a heterogeneous gain (λC =0 .05 and λP =0 .10).
Figure 2 shows the impulse response to one standard deviation of a transitory
productivity shock (εt) in a transparent regime. In response to the transitory pro-
ductivity shock, μC
t and μP
t immediately increase, and then gradually decrease to
zero. This represents private agents’ gradual recognition of the persistence of the
productivity shock, which is shown by some previous studies (Tambalotti [2003],
Edge, Laubach, and Williams [2005, 2007], and Gilchrist and Saito [2007]) as the key
mechanism to replicate the persistent movements of major macroeconomic variables.
In the case of the homogeneous gain (the solid line), the movements of μC
t and μP
t
are exactly the same. Then, the output gap and the inﬂation rate are always zero.
This means that in the case of the homogeneous gain, the central bank perfectly
15The data frequency is quarterly.
16This value corresponds to the case of unconditional price indexation in Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans [2005].
15stabilizes the output gap and inﬂa t i o nr a t eb yc o m p l e t e l yo ﬀsetting the variations in
the eﬃcient interest rate. However, in the case of the heterogeneous gain (the dashed
line), the output gap and inﬂation rate are never neutralized. In this case, the initial
rise of μC
t is less than that of μP
t , which means that the central bank underestimates
t h er i s eo ft h ee ﬃcient interest rate. Since this implies that the tightening of monetary
policy is insuﬃcient, the output gap and inﬂa t i o nr a t ea r ep u s h e du p w a r df o rs o m e
sustained periods.
Figure 3 indicates the impulse response to one standard deviation of a persistent
productivity shock (νt). Now the responses of μC
t and μP
t are hump-shaped, because
the shock itself is sustained in the case of persistent productivity shock. However,
the contrast between the cases of a homogeneous gain and a heterogeneous gain is
essentially the same as in Figure 2. That is, the output gap and inﬂation rate are
always zero in the case of a homogeneous gain, though they go upward in the case of
a heterogeneous gain.
Therefore, the results in this subsection indicate that, in a transparent regime,
the central bank perfectly oﬀsets the movements of the eﬃcient interest rate if the
gains are homogeneous. However, if the gains are heterogeneous, the central bank
does not perfectly oﬀset the movements of the eﬃcient interest rate. Consequently,
the output gap and inﬂation rate are not neutralized to productivity shocks even if
the central bank is transparent.
3.3 Impulse Response in an Opaque Regime
Next, we examine the impulse response to productivity shocks when the central bank
adopts an opaque regime. In an opaque regime, the impulse response depends not
only on the gain parameters of private agents and the central bank themselves (λC and
λP), but also on private agents’ conjecture about the central bank’s gain parameter
(λP[C]).
Figure 4 shows the impulse response to a transitory productivity shock in the case
of a homogeneous gain (λC = λP =0 .05). Evidently, the impulse response depends
on the value of λP[C]. Note that the case of λP[C] =0 .05 (the solid line) corresponds
to a transparent regime, because private agents do not have any misperception about
λC. Then, the output gap and inﬂation rate are always zero. This replicates the
result in the previous subsection.
In contrast to this result, when λP[C] is not equal to 0.05, the output gap and
inﬂation rate are never neutralized even if λC and λP are homogeneous. If λP[C] =
0.00 (the dashed line), μ
P[C]
t does not respond to a transitory shock. Then, the output
gap and inﬂation rate are pushed upward. Note that in this case, the central bank
perfectly oﬀsets the movement of the eﬃcient interest rate, because the rise of μC
t is
exactly the same as the rise of μP
t . Nevertheless, the output gap and inﬂation rate
16are not neutralized.17
This result is explained as follows. If λP[C] =0 .00 (or 0.10), private agents con-
sider that the central bank underestimates (or overestimates) the rise of the eﬃcient
interest rate. Since the eﬃcient interest rate is determined by the persistent produc-
tivity shock, private agents expect that the central bank’s misperception about the
eﬃcient interest rate remains at the next period. Based on this reasoning, private
agents raise (or lower) the expectations for the output gap (Etxt+1)a n di n ﬂation rate
(Etπt+1). This process is shown in (29) and (30). Then, the increases (or decreases) of
Etxt+1 and Etπt+1 raise (or lower) the current output gap and inﬂation rate through
the dynamic IS equation (5) and NKPC (13). This is the basic mechanism working
in Figure 4.
Next, we examine the impulse response in the case of a heterogeneous gain. Figure
5 shows the impulse response to a transitory productivity shock when the central
bank’s gain parameter is smaller than private agents’ gain parameter (λC =0 .05,
λP =0 .10) . T h es o l i dl i n ei st h ec a s eo fλP[C] =0 .05, which corresponds to the
transparent regime (the same as the dashed line in Figure 2). Since λC and λP
diﬀer, monetary policy does not oﬀset the movements of the eﬃcient interest rare.
Therefore, the output gap and inﬂation rate are not neutralized even if the central
bank adopts a transparent regime.
In the case of a heterogeneous gain, we ﬁnd that the variations of the output gap
and inﬂation rate in an opaque regime can become either smaller or larger than in
the transparent regime, depending on the value of λP[C].I fλP[C] =0 .00 (the dashed
line), the responses of the output gap and inﬂation rate are larger in an opaque regime
than in the transparent regime. However, if λP[C] =0 .10 (the dotted line), the result
is overturned. In this case, the responses are smaller in an opaque regime than in a
transparent regime. This result implies that the welfare loss becomes smaller in an
opaque regime than in a transparent regime. This result might be surprising, because
the central bank transparency is widely recognized as welfare-improving.
However, this does not mean that the central bank transparency is always welfare-
reducing when λP[C] is larger than λC. Notice that, if λP[C] takes a still larger value,
such as λP[C] =0 .25, then the drop in the inﬂation rate becomes quite large. Under
our parameter setting, the welfare loss becomes larger in an opaque regime than in
a transparent regime. Therefore, the result shows that central bank transparency
improves social welfare when λP[C] is far greater than λC. This implies that whether
central bank transparency improves social welfare or not depends on the direction
and the magnitude of private agents’ misperception about λC.18
In sum, the impulse response in an opaque regime depends on the value of λP[C].
17These results can be also conﬁrmed in the case of a persistent productivity shock.
18We have conﬁrmed that essentially the same result can be obtained in the case of a persistent
productivity shock.
17When λP[C] diﬀers from λC, the central bank cannot perfectly stabilize the output
gap and inﬂation rate even if the central bank completely oﬀsets the variations of
the eﬃcient interest rate. In addition, if λC and λP are heterogeneous, central bank
transparency can either improve or worsen social welfare, depending on the value of
λP[C]. In the next subsection, we examine exactly how the inﬂuence of central bank
transparency depends on the combinations of λC, λP,a n dλP[C].
3.4 Gains and Losses from Transparency
The previous subsection has shown that welfare loss in an opaque regime can be
smaller than in a transparent regime, depending on the value of λP[C]. This result
could be considered striking, because central bank transparency is widely recognized
as welfare-improving.
To understand the reason for this result, it is useful to look at the reduced-form
solutions (32) and (33). If we ignore the cost-push shock and monetary policy shock,




t and the diﬀerence between μC
t and μP
t . Suppose that the movements of
μC
t and μP
t are exactly the same. Then, the second terms of (32) and (33) become
zero. This is the situation in which the central bank perfectly oﬀsets the variations
of the eﬃcient interest rate. Then, the welfare loss is minimized when the ﬁrst





t ). Therefore, in the case of a homogeneous gain,
central bank transparency is always desirable, because private agents’ misperception
of μC
t is merely a source of disturbance to the economy.
However, in the case of a heterogeneous gain, private agents’ misperception of μC
t
is not necessarily harmful to the economy. Suppose that μC
t is much smaller than μP
t ,
which means that the central bank largely underestimates the level of the eﬃcient
interest rate. Then, the second terms of (32) and (33) take large positive values,
which means that the output gap and inﬂation rate are pressured upward by the
central bank’s unintentional monetary easing. In this environment, private agents’
misperception of μC
t might mitigate the impact of monetary easing. That is, if μ
P[C]
t
is larger than μC
t (but smaller than μP
t ), then the ﬁrst terms of (32) and (33) become
negative and they oﬀset the positive impacts of the second terms of (32) and (33).
Intuitively, this occurs because private agents underestimate the strength of current
monetary easing and, for that reason, the expectations for the future output gap and
inﬂation rate are sustained at a lower level than that under the transparent regime.
So far, we have explained the inﬂuence of central bank transparency by regarding
μP
t , μC
t ,a n dμ
P[C]
t as given. However, since μP
t , μC
t ,a n dμ
P[C]
t depend on the gain
parameters (λP, λC,a n dλP[C]), we can clarify how the welfare loss depends on these
gain parameters. For this purpose, we carry out stochastic simulations, in which
we introduce one standard deviation of all the stochastic shocks (the transitory and
18persistent productivity shocks, cost-push shock, and monetary policy shock). Then
we simply compare the social welfare loss in a transparent regime and in an opaque
regime. For this comparison, we calculate the “welfare gain from transparency”,
which is deﬁned as the welfare loss in an opaque regime minus the welfare loss in a
transparent regime. If the welfare gain from transparency is negative, central bank
transparency is welfare-reducing.
The upper panel of Figure 6 shows the welfare gain from transparency in the case
of a homogeneous gain (λC = λP =0 .05). In this case, the welfare gain is minimized
when λP[C] is equal to λC.I fλP[C] takes a diﬀerent value from λC, the welfare gain
from transparency becomes strictly positive. Therefore, central bank transparency
always improves social welfare in the case of a homogeneous gain.
However, in the case of a heterogeneous gain, transparency can either improve or
worsen social welfare. The middle panel of Figure 6 corresponds to the case where
the central bank’s gain parameter is smaller than private agents’ gain parameter
(λC =0 .05 and λP =0 .10). Now the welfare gain from transparency can be either
positive or negative, depending on the value of λP[C].I f λP[C] is smaller than λC,
the welfare gain from transparency is positive. This is because, in this case, private
agents overestimate the magnitude of heterogeneity between the central bank and
private agents (
¯ ¯λC − λP¯ ¯). In this situation, central bank transparency contributes
to reduce private agents’ overestimation of heterogeneity. However, if λP[C] is larger
than λC and smaller than the critical value (λ), private agents’ misperception oﬀsets
the distortion due to the heterogeneity between λC and λP. Then, the central bank’s
disclosure about the value of λC r e m o v e st h i so ﬀsetting eﬀect of private agents’ mis-
perception. This is the reason why central bank transparency is undesirable in this
case. However, if λP[C] is a still larger value (such as λP[C] =0 .25), then the welfare
gain from transparency again becomes positive. This is because the central bank’s
disclosure about λC removes the distortion due to private agents’ large mispercep-
tion of heterogeneity in gain parameters (λP − λP[C] < 0), which is in completely
opposite direction to the actual heterogeneity (λP − λC > 0). This result implies
that if private agents’ misperception of λC is quite large, central bank transparency
is desirable regardless of the sign of misperception (λP[C] −λC < 0 or > 0). In other
words, transparency can be welfare-reducing only if private agents’ misperception of
λC is not too large.
In sum, Figure 6 shows that the desirability of central bank transparency depends
on the combinations of the values of λC, λP,a n dλP[C]. In the case of a homogeneous
gain (λC = λP), transparency improves social welfare, regardless of the value of λP[C].
However, in the case of a heterogeneous gain (λC 6= λP), transparency can be either
welfare-improving or welfare-reducing, depending on the gain parameters used by the
central bank and private agents (λC and λP) and private agents’ conjecture on the
gain parameter used by the central bank (λP[C]).
19By the way, which case corresponds to the situation monetary policymakers usu-
ally face? In our view, a homogeneous gain could be regarded as a relatively special
case, which is only achieved in the long run, because we have large uncertainty and
the possible structural changes on the variances of transitory and persistent produc-
tivity shocks (σ2
ε and σ2
ν). On that ground, it could be considered that a central bank
typically faces uncertainty as to the desirability of central bank transparency about
the views on future productivity growth.
4 Implications for Monetary Policy Actions
In the previous section, we examined how central bank transparency inﬂuences social
welfare. However, we have not examined how the desirable monetary policy action
depends on central bank transparency or the forecasting mechanisms used by the
central bank and private agents. Therefore, in this section, we investigate this issue.
To do so, we speciﬁcally examine the optimal policy response to the inﬂation rate
(i.e., the optimal value of γ in monetary policy rule (14)) under a transparent regime
and under an opaque regime, respectively.
4.1 Optimal Response to Inﬂation in a Transparent Regime
To investigate the optimal policy response to the inﬂation rate, we ﬁrst calculate the
optimal value of γ in a case where productivity shocks are absent. This virtually
corresponds to the case of a homogeneous gain in a transparent regime, because
productivity shocks become irrelevant to the economic dynamics in that case. We
regard this case as the benchmark in this section.
To calculate the optimal value of γ in the benchmark case, we assume that all the
values of μP
t , μC
t ,a n dμ
P[C]
t are equal to zero in (32) and (33). Then we substitute
(32) and (33) into welfare function (16), and minimize (16) with respect to γ.A s
a result, we obtain the optimal value of γ in the absence of a productivity shock,
denoted as γ∗,a sf o l l o w s : 19






Thus, γ∗ depends on the relative size in the variances of the monetary policy
shock and cost-push shock (σ2
ξ/σ2
ζ). If the monetary policy shock is absent (σξ =0 ),
then γ∗ becomes exactly equal to θ. However, if the variance of the monetary policy
shock is nonzero, then γ∗ becomes larger than θ. Under our parameter setting, γ∗ is
4.045, which is slightly larger than θ =3 .778.
19When we set γ = γ
∗, the policy rule (14) corresponds to optimal discretionary policy in the
absence of a productivity shock.
20Figure 7 shows the welfare loss when the central bank adopts transparent regime.
Here, we assume that λC is 0.05. Since the central bank is transparent, λP[C] becomes
0.05. The welfare loss depends on the value of λP. In the case of a homogeneous
gain (λP =0 .05), welfare loss is minimized when the central bank chooses γ = γ∗.
However, in the cases of a heterogeneous gain (λP =0 .00, 0.02, 0.08,a n d0.10), the
loci of the welfare loss are shifted to the upper-right region of Figure 7. Then the
optimal value of γ for each value of λP becomes larger than γ∗, since the central bank
can reduce the welfare loss by setting the value of γ greater than γ∗.T h e o p t i m a l
value of γ is especially large when the diﬀerence between λC and λP is large, such as
t h ec a s eo fλP =0 .00 or 0.10.
We can understand the reason for these results by looking at (31). In (31), the
diﬀerence between μC
t and μP
t appears as the disturbance to the dynamic IS equation.
Therefore, the diﬀerence between μC
t and μP
t plays essentially the same role as the
monetary policy shock (ξt), since it constitutes the source of the demand shock. As
in (34), the optimal value of γ is large when the variance of the demand shock is
large. This is the reason why the optimal value of γ is large when the heterogeneity
between λC and λP is prominent.
4.2 Optimal Response to Inﬂa t i o ni na nO p a q u eR e g i m e
In this subsection, we investigate the optimal policy response to the inﬂation rate
when the central bank adopts an opaque regime. In an opaque regime, the welfare
loss depends on the value of λP[C], since the economic dynamics depend on λP[C],a s
shown in Section 3.3.
Figure 8 summarizes the welfare loss in an opaque regime. The upper panel shows
the case of a homogeneous gain (λC =0 .05 and λP =0 .05). The case of λP[C] =0 .05
corresponds to a transparent regime, in which the optimal value of γ is γ∗.I fλP[C]
diﬀers from 0.05 (such as λP[C] =0 .00, 0.10,a n d0.20) ,t h eo p t i m a lv a l u eo fγ is larger
than γ∗. The optimal value of γ is particularly large when the diﬀerence between
λP[C] and λC is large, such as the case of λP[C] =0 .20.
The middle and bottom panels of Figure 8 show the case of a heterogeneous gain
(λC 6= λP). In the case of a heterogeneous gain, the welfare loss for the given value
of γ is not minimized in a transparent regime. This can be conﬁrmed in the middle
panel. There, the welfare loss for the given value of γ becomes larger in a transparent
regime than in the opaque regime of λP[C] =0 .10. In addition, the optimal value
of γ is larger in a transparent regime than in the opaque regime of λP[C] =0 .10.
Furthermore, the optimal value of γ is not necessarily monotonically increasing with
the diﬀerence between λP and λC.
The reason for these results can be explained as follows. As we have seen in
the previous subsection, the diﬀerence between μC
t and μP
t plays the role of the
demand shock. However, in contrast to a transparent regime, it is possible that the
21expectations for the output gap (Etxt+1)a n di n ﬂation rate (Etπt+1)a tl e a s tp a r t i a l l y
oﬀset the impact of heterogeneity between μC
t and μP
t in (31) because, as in (29) and
(30), these expectations depend on the value of μ
P[C]
t in an opaque regime. This
happens in the case of λP[C] =0 .10 in the middle panel of Figure 8 and also in the
case of λP[C] =0 .05 in the bottom panel of Figure 8
In sum, the social welfare loss depends on the combinations of λC, λP,a n dλP[C] in
an opaque regime. As a result, the optimal value of γ in an opaque regime depends
on these gain parameters. A problem here is that the values of λP and λP[C] are
not directly observable by the central bank. In this sense, the central bank faces
uncertainty about the optimal policy response. However, in any case, the optimal
value of γ is at least larger than (or equal to) γ∗. In other words, any value less than
γ∗ cannot be optimal in all the combinations of λC, λP,a n dλP[C]. Therefore, if the
central bank is uncertain about the values of λC, λP,a n dλP[C], then it is sensible
for central bank to respond strongly to the variations of the inﬂation rate.
4.3 Inﬂuence of Private Agents’ Learning on λ
C
Until the previous subsection, we have assumed that private agents’ conjecture on
the gain parameter used by the central bank (λP[C]) is time-invariant. However, we
can consider the possibility that private agents gradually learn the value of λC by ob-
serving the central bank’s policy actions. If we introduce such a learning mechanism,
t h eo p t i m a lv a l u eo fγ depends on the speed of learning of the private agents.
As for the mechanism of the private agents’ learning, we introduce a recursive
procedure in forming the value of λP[C].F i r s t ,w ed e ﬁne a variable ht as below:
ht = it − γπt − (ρ + z). (35)
ht represents the residual of policy action, which is calculated as the variation
of the nominal interest rate except for the response to the inﬂation rate (γπt)a n d
the steady-state value of the real interest rate (ρ + z). Since we assume that private
agents can observe it and πt, ht is computable to private agents at period t.
From (14) and (35), ht c a nb ee x p r e s s e da sf o l l o w s :
ht = φμC
t + ξt. (36)
Thus, ht is the amalgam of φμC
t and ξt. By substituting (23) into (36), we obtain
the following equation:
St = λCXt + ξt, (37)
where St and Xt are deﬁned as St ≡ ht − φ2μC
t−1 and Xt ≡ φ(zt − z) − φ2μC
t−1,r e -
spectively. Private agents can estimate λC by regressing equation (36) with recursive
least squares (RLS), because they know the values of St and Xt at period t. Suppose
22that private agents initially conjecture the value of λC as λ
P[C]
0 . Then we can apply
the following recursive formula to obtain the estimate of λ
P[C]






t Xt(St − λ
P[C]
t−1 Xt), (38)
Rt = Rt−1 + ωP(X2
t − Rt−1), (39)
where ωP is the constant gain and Rt is the moment matrix of Xt.20
Once we obtain the value of λ
P[C]
t , the estimate of μC
t−1, which is denoted as μ
P[C]
t ,







t [(zt − z) − φμ
P[C]
t−1 ]. (40)
In numerical simulations, we set two alternative values for constant gain ωP (0.025
and 0.10). As Figure 9 shows, λ
P[C]
t converges to the true value of λC. The speed of
convergence is slower when the value of ωP is smaller.
Figure 10 shows the welfare loss in the case where private agents update the
value of λ
P[C]
t by using ωP =0 .025. The diﬀerence between Figure 8 and Figure
10 simply reﬂects the inﬂuence of private agents’ learning on λC. Because of the
learning mechanism, each locus of the welfare loss in Figure 10 shifts away from the
corresponding locus in Figure 8. In some cases, these shifts are downward. This
could be regarded as natural consequences, since private agents’ learning reduces
their misperception of the value of λC. However, in other cases (such as the cases of
λ
P[C]
0 =0 .10 i nt h em i d d l ep a n e la n dλ
P[C]
0 =0 .20 in the bottom panel), the shifts
are upward. These results suggest that private agents’ learning mechanism does not
necessarily reduce the social welfare loss for a given value of γ.T h i sﬁnding indicates
that the optimal value of γ does not necessarily approach γ∗ with the introduction
of private agents’ learning mechanism.21
We can understand the reason for this result by looking at Figure 6. In the case of
a homogeneous gain, social welfare monotonically decreases while λ
P[C]
t approaches
λC. However, in the case of a heterogeneous gain, social welfare does not necessarily
decrease through the process of learning. For example, in the middle panel, if the
initial value of λ
P[C]
t i sj u s tt h es a m ea sλP, private agents’ learning process increases
the social welfare loss. This is because, as explained in Section 3.4, private agents’
initial misperception of λC reduces the magnitude of the demand shock in this case.
In this environment, private agents’ learning process magniﬁes the volatility of the
20See Evans and Honkapohja [2001] for the details of the RLS formula. The use of constant gain
implies that private agents consider the possibility that the central bank shifts the gain parameter
(λ
C).
21Notice that the welfare loss in the case that private agents initially guess correctly (λ
P[C]
0 =0 .05
in the upper panels of Figure 10 and Figure 11) is not the same as the welfare loss in the transparent
regime. This is because private agents do not know that the true value of λ
C is 0.05 and revise the
estimate λ
P[C]
t in each period even though they initially guess correctly on λ
C.
23demand shock by eliminating the inﬂuence of private agents’ misperception that has
been favorable to social welfare.
Figure 11 shows the welfare loss in the case where private agents learn the value
of λC by using ωP =0 .10. In this case, the welfare losses converge for each value of
λ
P[C]
0 . This result is natural, since the high constant gain implies that private agents
quickly learn the value of λC. As a result, the optimal values of γ in an opaque
regime converge across the alternative values of λ
P[C]
0 . In this sense, the central bank
faces smaller uncertainty about the optimal policy response when the value of ωP is
higher.
But, a problem here is that the central bank cannot directly observe the value of
ωP. This means that the central bank faces uncertainty about the speed of conver-
gence of private agents’ learning. Nevertheless, the optimal value of γ is still larger
at least than γ∗ for both values of ωP =0 .025 and 0.10. This suggests that, for any
value of ωP, the central bank should set the value of γ larger than γ∗. Therefore, it
is sensible for the central bank to respond strongly to the variations of the inﬂation
rate even if we introduce the inﬂuence of private agents’ learning on λC.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
In this study, we have investigated how central bank transparency about the views on
future productivity growth inﬂuences social welfare. To this end, we have used a New
Keynesian framework in which both the central bank and private agents are engaged
in ﬁltering problems about the persistence of productivity growth. Since the central
bank and private agents do not know the true value of the signal-to-noise ratio, the
gain parameters used in the ﬁltering problems can be heterogeneous. If the central
bank is not transparent, private agents must conjecture the central bank’s estimate on
the eﬃcient level of the interest rate. Under this setup, we have shown that central
bank transparency does not necessarily improve social welfare. It can potentially
yield a welfare loss, depending on (i) the gain parameters used by the central bank
and private agents and (ii) private agents’ conjecture on the gain parameter used by
the central bank. If the gain parameters used by the central bank and private agents
are homogeneous, then central bank transparency always improves social welfare.
However, if these gain parameters are heterogeneous, central bank transparency can
be either welfare-improving or welfare-reducing. Our study has shown that, if the
central bank is uncertain about the combination of the gain parameters (including
private agents’ conjecture), it is sensible for the central bank to respond strongly to
the variations of the inﬂation rate, because the misperceptions on these parameters
become the source of demand shock.
There are some possible extensions of this study. First, we have not incorporated
the learning mechanism in forming gain parameters used by the central bank and
24private agents (λC and λP). This is largely due to computational diﬃc u l t yi nl e a r n i n g
the theoretical values of shock variances (σε and σν), especially in the presence of
possible structural change. However, it might be unrealistic to consider that both of
the central bank and private agents do not learn these values at all, even in the long
run. Therefore, in future research, the learning mechanism for the shock variances
should be incorporated. Second, we have excluded the possibility that the central
bank does not honestly announce its true view on future productivity growth. If we
consider the possibility of central bank’s dishonest information provision, we must
investigate a credibility problem. Third, in this study, we have simply compared
the economic dynamics and social welfare in a transparent regime and in an opaque
regime. Therefore, we do not consider the possibility that the central bank decides
whether it should be transparent or opaque in each period. If we take account of this
possibility, then we must consider the credibility problem again. Fourth, we have
assumed that the central bank chooses between a perfectly transparent regime and
a perfectly opaque regime. However, it is possible to extend our analysis to include
the possibility that the central bank chooses some intermediate regime. These issues
should be explored in future research.
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Welfare Gain from TransparencyFigure 7: Social Welfare in Transparent Regime
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